Using the keyword search on www.firefighternearmiss.com, I wasn’t surprised to locate pages of reports identifying “communications” as a contributing factor in the incident. Have you ever attended an incident critique when communications didn’t come up? I haven’t. Fire chiefs face a constant challenge to create an infrastructure that enhances the survivability of their forces, and communications is one essential component of that infrastructure.
Following are excerpts from three near-miss reports involving communications. Reviewing the details of these incidents offers insight into communication system capabilities, procedures and needed improvements. Further, reviewing others’ successes and near misses can serve as guideposts in a world of ever-evolving technology.
Event Descriptions
Report No. 07-764: “At 1409 hrs, we received a residential alarm reported as a farmhouse on fire. Incoming units were advised by Command that the main power line feeding the house had flame impingement, and the D side was to be completely avoided.
“As the initial attack was commenced from the A side, four oncoming firefighters from a paged fire recall reported into command. They were given assignments to assist both Attack No. 1 and Attack No. 2, and two of them were assigned a third line (Attack No. 3).
“As the fire was being attacked, both Attack No. 1 and Attack No. 2 began repositioning their lines to the D side. Command called the captain in charge of Attack No. 1 and advised him to not proceed. Command attempted to contact Attack No. 3 to no avail. Attack No. 3 continued to move their line farther over to the D side. At this time, Command was turned over to the Duty Chief, and Chief 1 proceeded toward them to give them face-to-face orders to retreat.
“As Chief 1 approached them, the power line broke away from the riser and fell to the ground behind Attack No. 3. One of the firefighters on Attack No. 3 was walking backward and was about to step on the power line when it arced and jumped away from him in a shower of sparks. The firefighter jumped away at the same time due to the shock of almost being electrocuted.”
Report No. 06-450: “After arriving at a working structure fire with the entire roof involved, I (the driver) was donning PPE and proceeding to join my crew already inside the structure conducting search-and-rescue operations. There was a report of an unaccounted-for occupant who was later found at a friend’s house.
“The search and rescue was attempted due to miscommunications between personnel. These miscommunications began when the wrong tactical channel was assigned by communications. A corrected channel was given after fire operations had begun, but not all units were aware of the change, preventing effective communications.”
Report No. 05-070: “We responded to a structure fire at an abandoned supermarket. From previous pre-plans, we knew this market had a ‘Summerbell’-type roof, which can fail early when exposed to fire. A crew advanced a hoseline to the interior to make an offensive attack. A second company was assigned to back up the initial attack. A third engine was assigned to exposures on the B side of the building. The officer on this engine company reported heavy smoke and flames that began to appear in the area where there was a mezzanine over the fire. The officer realized this could endanger the interior crews, who may be unaware that there was this much fire immediately above them. He relayed this information to the IC, who immediately ordered all interior crews out of the structure. An accountability check was made and the operation was changed to defensive. Within a couple minutes of crews leaving the building, the roof collapsed. Good communication and being aware of fire conditions definitely prevented serious injury and/or loss of life.”
Comments
Near-Miss Report No. 07-764 addresses a response to a well-involved farmhouse fire. All command communications were given via radio. However, transmissions did not follow the communications-order model, and a firefighter was nearly electrocuted when an energized line fell in Division Delta near his position-a location Command had advised him to avoid.
Chief Alan Brunacini, a member of the Firefighter Near-Miss Task Force, writes in “Fire Command, Second Edition” that, “To ensure that the message is completely and properly received by the receiver, the commo-order model should be used. Before the message is sent, the receivers must indicate that they are ready. After a message is sent, the receivers must briefly restate the message to verify understanding.” This simple procedure will go a long way to improve safety and clarify strategic and tactical objectives and an incident’s progress.
Near-Miss Report No. 06-450 addresses a working house fire with a report of an unaccounted-for occupant. The occupant was later located at a friend’s house. How many times have you seen this? Search and rescue was attempted due to miscommunications that began with an incorrectly assigned tactical channel.
On this topic, “Fire Command” addresses the dispatcher’s role: “Dispatch can help the team in conducting effective commo by listening critically, repeating (parroting) transmissions that don’t come through clearly, and assisting players that are having trouble connecting with each other during difficult commo times.” Additionally, it has been my personal observation that a radio operator’s proficiency is directly proportional to their understanding of the team’s game plan. “It is critical that dispatch personnel, as a participant, understand the incident management system before the event occurs, and then become quickly integrated into the incident operation as it progresses. They must use their positioning, hardware, and software advantage to support ongoing incident communications,” Brunacini writes.
Near-Miss Report No. 05-070 reports a fire in an abandoned supermarket where all interior crews were ordered out of the structure. In the report’s Lessons Learned section, the reporter notes, “This incident emphasized the need for good communications and the importance of everyone on the fireground being encouraged to provide input back to the IC when they note hazardous conditions.” I couldn’t have said it better myself.
A report like this brings up many questions: If my team had to evacuate a fire building at an incident, how would we do it? Do we have an evacuation signal? Are all the communications participants trained on the signal and required actions subsequent to it? If multiple-channel radio equipment is used, are all channels monitored? With the increased use of mutual aid, are all on-scene agencies capable of using all channels? Are the mutual-aid departments prepared to properly perform when an evacuation is signaled?
Recommendations
When conducting research to answer these questions, I located a U.S. Fire Administration technical report titled “Improving Firefighter Communications, USFA-TR-099.” The report is informative and references a number of applicable NFPA standards related to communications.
Following is a summary of recommendations from the report:
- All firefighters should be individually equipped with portable radios. At the very least, each two-person team entering a fire situation should have a portable radio.
- A better portable radio, suitable for and designed around use in the structural firefighting environment, is a priority for the fire service.
- More training should be conducted to develop effective firefighter communications skills.
- Policies and procedures should be developed that define standard message format, (important/urgent messages vs. routine messages), mayday procedures, procedures for operations conducted on multiple channels, roles and responsibilities of all participants in the communications process, and procedures for regular situation reporting.
- Radio discipline must achieve a balance between limiting non-essential radio traffic and ensuring that potentially important information is regularly broadcast.
- Effective incident management depends on effective communications between firefighters and the IC. Plain language and the use of aides to help monitor radio traffic during the incident are essential.
- All firefighters should practice actively listening to radio traffic for information that may affect the performance of their assignments.
- Senior fire officers must instill a culture that encourages firefighters to request assistance and communicate operation problems early. They should emphasize that calling for help at the first sign of problems is the expected action for safe emergency operations.
- Firefighters can reduce interference factors by turning down the volume on portable radios, shielding microphones, turning off sirens before transmitting when possible and maximizing face-to-face communications.
- Dispatchers should be continually involved in fireground communication by actively listening for transmissions that might go unnoticed, reporting changes to the normal response order and conveying messages among responding units. Care should be taken, however, to minimize fireground radio traffic from being overridden by powerful transmitters at dispatch centers.
- More attention and research should be directed toward identifying barriers to effective incident scene communication and proactively preventing communication problems before an incident.
Conclusion
“Communications dominate battle: broadly considered, they are the most important single element in strategy, political or military.”
-The Problem of Asia, 1900
Because communications effects all event participants, it is incumbent on each and everyone of us to build a communications system that’s simple enough to be routine yet advanced enough to meld multiple disciplines and agencies. Achieving this endeavor will allow us to accomplish our mission, protect life and property, and retire healthy.
