In 1953, Lloyd Layman published Fire Fighting Tactics, a book that contained an acronym that would shape the next 60 years of fireground operations: RECEO-VS (R-Rescue, E-Exposure, C-Confinement, E-Extinguishment, O-Overhaul, and V-Ventilation, S-Salvage). Ever since, commanding officers have used this acronym to prioritize actions and mitigate fires.
Today, as the dynamics of the modern fireground continue to be revealed (or demystified), some instructors are challenging this longstanding training tool. I myself have advocated revisiting RECEO-VS to ensure that the knowledge we have of modern fire behavior is given proper consideration.
Two of the most notable challenges to RECEO-VS:
- Are we better off initiating fire attack (“Containment” as defined by Layman) before initiating rescue operations?
- Is firefighter-initiated ventilation no longer a useful tactic for the modern fireground?
To be clear, none of the published research advocates discontinuing the tactic of “aggressive” ventilation or interior attack. Nor has there been a suggestion that “rescue” would no longer be our highest tactical priority. The research simply suggests that we “redefine the timing and methods” of our actions and give careful consideration to the risk and consequences of each.
Anyone who claims to be a student of the fire service will recognize the name Paul Grimwood. Grimwood, a veteran of the British fire service, is an experienced fire service veteran who maintains a willingness to consider new theories and methodologies. In his last book, Euro Firefighter (published well before the current research being conducted here in the United States), Grimwood defines two tactics that support some of our findings: anti-ventilation and tactical ventilation.
Anti-ventilation is simply the concept of limiting fire development by controlling the airflow to the base of the fire. In other words, control the air track by closing doors and “delaying” traditional forms of ventilation. Tactical ventilation, on the other hand, is the “coordinated act” of ventilating a building using the appropriate means–vertical, horizontal, pressurized, etc.
Another point of contention is the idea of resetting the fire (or knocking it down) from the exterior as a means of supporting our most important tactical objective–rescue. This same tactic disguised under the name transitional/blitz attack has been used by some of the most aggressive fire departments for more than 20 years. The only difference now is that this tactic is being categorized as offensive, to support or facilitate rescue operations, as opposed to being defined as a “defensive” operation.
So why is there so much pushback regarding tactical priorities and the recommendations related to ventilation and fire attack? Is there a fear that truck companies will be a thing of the past? Is there an unspoken trepidation that the proposed tactics will take the “fun” out of firefighting? Or is it simply that the fire service is changing and you, them or us are not ready to accept it?
Layman’s longstanding tactical priorities of RECEO-VS are as true today as they were when they were first developed. Yet I do believe that there is room for change in how we achieve them. Rescue is, and always should be, our first priority. But when we’re considering how to successfully accomplish a rescue on the modern fireground, we must consider the facts. A short burst of water from the exterior (previously viewed as taboo), coupled with an aggressive effort to control the air track (closing doors and delaying traditional forms of ventilation), are two of the most important tactics we can initiate to support a successful rescue operation.
Secondly, the safest way to support interior crews attempting to achieve the objectives of confinement and extinguishment is door control (or anti-ventilation) and tactical ventilation operations.
To be effective on the modern fireground requires us to be strategists and tacticians who understand the importance of a standardized approach (RECEO-VS) while at the same time demonstrate a willingness to adapt and change in accordance with the situation. Lloyd Layman summed it up best when he said, “Success or failure of a command officer on the fireground depends upon his ability to estimate the situation, weigh the various factors, apply basic principles, decide what action should be taken, formulate a plan of operation, and see that the plan is executed promptly and efficiently.”
Layman has provided us with the plan; research has refined our principles. Now, it’s up to us to ensure they’re executed with safety and efficiency.
