I have never been in the military. My daughter Samantha served in the first Gulf War as a medic in a combat zone; her son Stryder just graduated Advanced Individual Training school at Fort Lee, Va., as a 92 F specialist. Of course I was concerned for Samantha’s safety when she was deployed, as I am concerned about my grandson’s potential deployment–but none of my friends or relatives in the armed services were ever killed in action (KIA). Although I have an eternal gratitude to all military service members who gave the ultimate sacrifice to make and keep us free, my direct connection to the concept of being KIA is fairly limited.
I do, however, tear up when taps are played, just as I cry at firefighter funerals, although I’ve been blessed never to be on an incident where a firefighter died.
Why do I bring up KIA in conjunction with firefighter funerals? Since 1970, when I joined the fire service, I have been uncomfortable with the comparison of firefighters to soldiers in combat. At a 2012 national lecture I made the comment that, “Comparing a firefighter death to a soldier’s death is an insult to the soldier.” To my knowledge, that’s the only statement from this 90-minute lecture that was shared on social media. Yet we continue to make the comparison.
The military and the fire service have different missions. In war, military personnel are trying to kill each other to defend their governments and/or societies or to claim additional power for their group or country. The fire service and firefighting are about saving lives. What we do is not war or combat.
Defining KIA
We all know what KIA means, right? Actually, the definition is a bit more complicated than you might have thought. According to Wikipedia:
“Killed in Action (KIA) is a casualty classification generally used by militaries to describe the deaths of their own forces at the hands of hostile forces. The United States Department of Defense, for example, says that those declared KIA need not have fired their weapons but have been killed due to hostile attack. KIAs do not come from incidents such as accidental vehicle crashes and other ‘non-hostile’ events or terrorism. KIA can be applied both to front-line combat troops and to naval, air and support troops. Someone who is killed in action during a particular event is denoted with a †dagger beside their name to signify their death in that event. Further, KIA denotes one to have been killed in action on the battlefield whereas died of wounds (or DOW) relates to someone who survived to reach a medical treatment facility.”
The fire service equivalent of KIA is the line-of-duty death (LODD)–yet in contrast to the military’s narrow definition of KIA, the fire service classifies all firefighter occupational fatalities as LODDs. This includes a heart attack 24 hours after responding or training, dying at a training activity, falling from a fire truck that is moving or parked, dying in a vehicle crash when not wearing a seatbelt, dying from being struck by a moving vehicle, or dying on a treadmill while exercising at the fire station.
Using the term LODD perpetuates the myth that “Firefighters have to get killed, it’s part of the job.”(1) When we use these words, we are continuing the tradition started almost 300 years ago in the era of Ben Franklin. Ben’s firemen were volunteers trying to protect their neighbors from the ravages of fire. There was great risk to the firemen and deaths did occur. When a fireman lay down his life to help his neighbor, the entire community felt the loss and commemorated their friend as a hero–regardless of the cause of death, such as slipping on the wet cobblestone street or being run over by the hose cart. (In Ben Franklin’s days it was entirely possible for firemen to have just left the pub to pull the hose cart to the fire. Needless to say, they didn’t do blood alcohol testing!)
After the Civil War, many military-trained men became the first paid firemen. Honoring fallen firefighters in the same manner as fallen soldiers was a natural extension of the military tradition into the fire service. Society and the fire service continue, to this day, to see almost any firefighter’s death as the ultimate sacrifice for the community.(2)
Chief Alan Brunacini has noted why this tradition is problematic: “When the fire kills us, our department typically conducts a huge ritualistic funeral ceremony, engraves our name on the honor wall and makes us an eternal hero. Every LODD gets the same terminal ritual regardless if the firefighter was taking an appropriate risk to protect a savable life or was recreationally freelancing in a clearly defensive place. A Fire Chief would commit instant occupational suicide by saying that the reason everyone is here today in their dress blues is because the dearly departed failed to follow the department safety plan. Genuine bravery and terminal stupidity both get the same eulogy. Our young firefighters are motivated and inspired to attack even harder by the ceremonialization of our battleground deaths.”(3)
This culture has been noted among researchers as well. Drs. Kunadharaju, Smith and DeJoy, (2010) from the College of Public Health at the University of Georgia, studied 213 firefighter LODDs. They concluded that:
“Operating with too few resources, compromising certain roles and functions, skipping or short-changing operational steps and safeguards and relying on extreme individual efforts and heroics may reflect the cultural paradigm of firefighting. This should not be construed to be a culture of negligence or incompetence, but rather a culture of longstanding acceptance and tradition. Within many fire service organizations, these operational tenets may be accepted as ‘the way we do things.’ Moreover, this tolerance of risk may be reinforced both externally and internally through the positive public image of firefighters and firefighting and internally through the fire service’s own traditions and member socialization.”(4)
Indeed, the fire service and the public rarely hold anyone accountable for a firefighter’s death. Some state laws actually shield firefighters from gross negligence related to another firefighter or civilian death.(5)
Trying Another Term
What if we replaced the term LODD with the term “occupational fatality”? Again, Wikipedia provides some clarity into whether this is a fitting definition for the fire service:
“An occupational fatality is a death that occurs while a person is at work or performing work-related tasks. Occupational fatalities are also commonly called ‘occupational deaths’ or ‘work-related deaths/fatalities’ and can occur in any industry or occupation. Common causes of occupational fatalities include falls, machine-related incidents, motor vehicle accidents, electrocution, falling objects, homicides and suicides. Occupational fatalities can be prevented.
“Many factors contribute to a fatal incident at work. Lack of appropriate employee training and failure to provide and enforce the use of safety equipment are frequent contributors to occupational fatalities. Incidents can also be the result of insufficient supervision of inexperienced employees or employees who have taken on a responsibility for which they are not properly trained. Poor worksite organization, staffing and scheduling issues, unworkable policies and practices and workplace culture can all play a role in occupational fatalities. In any case, the incident leading to an occupational fatality is generally not the fault of a single person, but the tragic result of a combination of many human and environmental factors.
“Occupational fatalities are preventable. Prevention of occupational fatalities depends on the understanding that worker safety is not only the responsibility of the worker, but is the primary responsibility of the employer. Employers must train all employees in the appropriate safety procedures and maintain a safe working environment so that fatalities are less likely to occur. An occupational fatality is not just the fault of the deceased worker; instead, it is the combination of unsafe work environments, insufficient safety training, and negligible employee supervision that contribute fatal incidents. As a result, it is imperative that an employer address all the potential risk factors at the workplace and educate all employees in safe work practices and risk awareness.”
A key part of the definition: An occupational fatality is not part of the job–rather, it’s an indication that something went wrong. Corrective action and accountability are applied so it does not happen again.
A Different Standard
Society does not hold the fire service to the same occupational safety standard as other industries. To illustrate this, let’s compare the Deepwater Horizon tragedy to the Charleston Sofa Super Store fire.
Following the Deepwater Horizon incident, British Petroleum (BP) pleaded guilty to felony manslaughter for the deaths of 11 workers, as well as environmental crimes and obstruction of Congress. BP paid $4 billion in fines and penalties.(6)
The city of Charleston, on the other hand, “does not admit the truth of any alleged facts, any of the characterizations of Respondent’s alleged conduct, or any of the conclusions set forth in the citation issued in this matter.” The South Carolina Office of Occupational Safety and Health “has made no representations or determinations concerning the probable cause of the injury or death of any person involved in the June 18, 2007, fire.” The fine for the Sofa Super Store fire–where nine firefighters were killed–was $3,160, but not for the dead firefighters. The citation was for three or more firefighters at the incident who weren’t wearing their personal protective equipment (PPE), three or more firefighters at the incident who weren’t wearing SCBA (excluding the dead firefighters), and the fact that the “employer knew or should have known that its written incident command system does not directly address those emergency response situations which do not include a HAZMAT incident.”(7)
I compare BP to Charleston not to find fault with any government agency, but to illustrate how the public and the fire service has a long tradition of acceptance of risk and loss of firefighters. This will continue if we perpetuate firefighter LODDs as just part of the job.
The Power of Words
“Line-of-duty death” is a 20th century term, just like “firemen.” Firefighters are not all men, and when a firefighter is killed it’s not part of the job. For the 21st century, the fire service and our society–the people we protect–need to understand firefighter causalities as occupational injuries and deaths that are preventable.
Ceremonies are important to the fire service and society. They communicate our values and beliefs about what we hold dear. If Chief Brunacini is correct, elaborate ceremonialization of battleground deaths should be reserved for soldiers killed in action and for firefighters who were taking an appropriate risk to protect a savable life. But even a change in our funeral ceremonies isn’t enough. We must also conduct mandatory, comprehensive casualty investigations, including inquests into the responsibility for firefighter occupational deaths. When we put those report references under our lost brother or sister’s picture hanging at the fire station, and every firefighter nationwide reads the report and looks into the face of our lost firefighter, we will not only remember them–we will learn the lesson they paid dearly to teach us.
Words are powerful. We need to change some of our words to help ensure “Everyone Goes Home.” Let’s start by changing how we refer to firefighter line-of-duty deaths.
Note: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent official positions of his employer, the National Fire Academy or the United States Fire Administration.
References
- Clark BA. (1976) “I don’t want my ears burned.” Fire Command, July 1976, p.17.
- Clark BA. (Oct. 2011) “Your behavior comes from Ben Franklin’s DNA” In Firehouse.com. Retrieved 12/26/12 from www.firehouse.com/topic/leadership-and-command/your-behavior-comes-ben-franklins-dna-fast-close-wet-risk-injury-death.
- Brunacini AV. (2008) “Fast /Close/Wet: Reducing Firefighter Deaths and Injuries: Changes in Concept, Policy and Practice.” Public Entity Risk Institute, Fairfax, Va.
- Kunadharaju K, Smith TD and DeJoy DM. (2011) “Line of duty deaths among U.S. firefighters: An analysis of fatality investigations.” Accident Analysis and Prevention. 43, 1,117—1,180.
- Clark BA. ( June 2012) “Fire/EMS safety and health week: Rules vs. DNA.” In Firehouse.com. Retrieved 12/26/12 from www.firehouse.com/article/10732003/fire-ems-safety-health-week-rules-vs-dna?print=true.
- US Department of Justice (Nov. 15, 2012) “BP Exploration and Production Inc. Agrees to Plead Guilty to Felony Manslaughter, Environmental Crimes and Obstruction of Congress Surrounding Deepwater Horizon Incident.” In Justice.gov. Retrieved Nov 19, 2012 from www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/November/12-ag-1369.html.
- State of South Carolina. (2007) Office of Occupational safety and Health of the South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation -vs- City of Charleston. Columbia: 961767 v. 7
