FireFighterNation

By Erik Litzenberg
Published Sunday, January 1, 2012 | From the January 2012 Issue of FireRescue

As fire service professionals, we consider the study of our past to be the first step toward the future. Unfortunately, when we study the lessons learned from the recent past, all too often those lessons are obvious and, worse yet, familiar.

That is certainly true of the lessons learned during the 2011 wildfire season, which include:

• Firefighter wellness remains a problem. Far too many firefighters die of heart attacks.  
• Communication remains a problem. Firefighters are routinely killed because they didn’t receive the message they were supposed to get.
• Driving remains a problem. Lest we forget: Tankers/tenders have different and shifting centers of gravity. Work-to-rest ratios and maximum driving times do make a difference.
• Trees still kill. In the past 10 years, approximately 33 percent of the reports submitted to the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center (WLLC; wildfirelessons.net) were related to trees. In 2010, Travis Dotson of the WLLC wrote in Ground Truths, “Trees and snags can fall on you anywhere at any time in any part of the country.” This has been true forever, yet it continues to be a major safety issue for firefighters year after year.

However, the proliferation of information about wildland/urban interface (WUI) fires in the United States and other parts of the world indicates that fire service professionals are looking for the lessons learned in order to avoid making the same mistakes others have made in the past. One need not look far to see the organizational changes being made as a result. Though the 2011 fire season overflowed with new learning opportunities, it was also ripe with evidence of lessons learned.

The Future of Fires
For those who doubt that wildland fire patterns are changing in the United States, the verdict is in: Wildland fires in the future will be bigger, more intense and more forceful.

The Wallow Fire, at more than 400,000 acres, was the biggest in Arizona history. The Las Conchas Fire was the biggest in New Mexico history and burned more than 45,000 acres in the first operational period alone. Record-setting fires in Texas continue to burn, and statistics tell the whole story: Since mid-November of 2010, there have been almost 30,000 fires in Texas, burning a total of 4 million acres. During this time firefighters saved more than  50,000 structures, but nearly 6,000 were lost. There have been more than 46,000 air drops in Texas in 2011, eclipsing an aviation record set in the 1980s in Yellowstone. The largest fires in Texas history occurred in April 2011 and in September 2011. Put simply, WUI/wildland fires have become more extreme in the last decade. Since 2000, wildland fires have burned, on average, twice the number of acres they burned in the 1990s. This trend is due to a number of factors:

• Past management practices have led to an accumulation of fuels.
• Drought and other stressors have increased, in part due to climate changes.
• Development and human activity have expanded the WUI.

The Modernization of Evacuation
The evacuation of Los Alamos National Laboratory during the Las Conchas Fire (June 26–Aug. 3) allowed for a test of what we, as a profession, have learned about evacuation. When we compare this operation to the 2001 Cerro Grande Fire, in which there were inconsistent trigger points, congested roadways and uninformed evacuees, the answer is clear: We are much better prepared for evacuation. Fire professionals unanimously cited the use of the IAFC’s Ready, Set, Go! guidelines as beneficial in evacuations.

But what, specifically, made the difference? Los Alamos Emergency Management Director Philmont Taylor and Fire Chief (Ret.) Doug Tucker provided the following three keys to their

1. Practice makes perfect: Table-top exercises gave emergency managers confidence. Well-communicated plans gave the residents confidence in the system. When smoke filled the air, they already knew how to react.
2. Use of the reverse 9-1-1 mass notification system: Before it was actually needed, the system was designed with community involvement, and the public was educated on how it worked.
3. Trigger points: Emergency managers collaboratively established trigger points to affect the decision to evacuate based upon the values at risk, the fire’s size and location(s), and the fuel models involved. Once the trigger points were set, the agencies did not second-guess them.

The Impact of Fuel Management
In its first week, the Wallow Fire consumed more than 40,000 acres and was rapidly approaching the community of Alpine. Decreasing relative humidity and increasing winds had brought the fire into the crowns of the surrounding trees. As the main fire entered the half-mile-wide White Mountain Stewardship Fuel Treatment units above Alpine, it dropped from the tree crowns to the surface level and the rate of spread slowed dramatically. Flame lengths became low enough to allow firefighters to safely attack the fire and protect homes and property.

This fuel treatment area was successful for three reasons:

1. The fuel treatment area reduced the severity and rate of spread of the fire.
2. The reduced intensity allowed for firefighters to be safely placed into operational areas.
3. Defensible space and home “hardening,” following the IAFC’s Ready, Set, Go! and Firewise guidelines, allowed homes in the affected area to be protected with fewer committed resources.   

Organizational Learning
This article started with those lessons that continue to present themselves, year after year, but one day we hope to put in the past. Looking back at the 2011 fire season, we see evidence that we are, indeed, learning from past experience. Though we haven’t significantly reduced the number of firefighter deaths due to heart attacks, there has been an increased focus on modifiable risk factors and heat-related injuries and illnesses. We continue to preach LCES—Lookouts, Communications, Escape Routes, Safety Zones—but with a new focus on solving the mystery of common communications.

The following recommendations come from the lessons learned in 2011:
1.  Promote a healthy department

• Require annual physicals.
• Start a health and wellness program.
• Require all firefighters to participate in a fitness program.

 2. Improve communications

• Create an interagency communication plan with all response agencies in your area.
• Make sure everyone in your agency is trained on the Incident Command System and that you are compliant with the National Incident Management  System.
• Maintain span-of-control and good communications.
• Make sure you are compliant with all FCC regulations, including narrowbanding.

3. Prevent accidents

•   Maintain work-to-rest ratios when possible.
•  Require driver training specific to the type of vehicle each person might drive.
•  Have a strict policy on drive times.
•  Use the Incident Response Pocket Guide to assist with risk management. (Every one of your firefighters should have a copy. It’s a tiny investment for a huge return.)
• Look Up, Look Down, and Look Around”—always!

A Final Word
The 2011 fire season presented clear evidence of organizational change based on past experience. Unfortunately, the fires in Texas, Arizona and New Mexico are indicative of the changing climate and will be even more commonplace in the future. However, the organized evacuation of Los Alamos, the interagency follow-through in Texas and the clear proof of the impact of fuels management across the country are evidence that we, as a profession, are learning to respond more effectively and efficiently.

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Erik Litzenberg

Erik Litzenberg is the assistant chief of operations for the Santa Fe (N.M.) Fire Department. He holds a master’s degree in public administration, and is currently working on a doctorate in fire and emergency management administration. Litzenberg is a graduate of the National Fire Academy Executive Fire Officer Program and represents the IAFC as a member of the Wildland Fire Policy Committee. Read Full Bio

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